We live in a world in which the international community aspires to protect and promote the quality of human life. To do so often requires the exercise of control over the very individuals, societies, states, and peoples that are the objects of concern. In other words, power is a prominent feature of a global ethics of care. This book examines paternalism beyond borders from the nineteenth century to the present, and in everyday practices of humanitarianism, human rights, development, and other projects designed to improve the lives of others. It <?ffers a provocative look at the subtle and variable ways that power works its way in and through global ethics, and considers whether and when paternalism might be justified.
indirect mechanisms of international institutions. They both reject the paternalism of direct responsibility as well as the idea that the West does not have the responsibility to act on the problems of non-Western states. In both these frameworks, Western wealth and power -the fact that Western states and institutions set the international agenda and shape the possibilities for the progress and development of non-Western states -are used to argue that there is an indirect responsibility for the outcomes in non-Western states and societies. The key point is that this form of new paternalist responsibility operates as a form of self-critique and as a technology of self"governance. On· the basis of concerns with democracy, development, and human rights, international regimes extend not only in terms of their indirect impact on non-Western states but also in the construction of new regimes of transparency and ethical codes, monitoring and regulating a broad swath of international actors and their activities.
Implicit in the ontological understanding of associational responsibility is also a license to "interfere" or to "enlighten" the ·private choice making of Western citizens, often seen to lack the required reflexivity in their lack of understanding of their own complicity in, and responsibility (or, these problems. New paternalism works on the basis of generating awareness of indirect connections and consequences and thus relies not merely on the generation of information, research, and transparency in order for citizens and other actors to reflect upon their choices and actions, but also depends on the inculcation of a community of ethico-political activists, advocates, and researchers. In this way, new paternalism builds a new political constituency and a new political discourse based upon a consensus that becoming aware of the problems of others enables us to govern ourselves on the basis of both political responsibility and ethical responsivity. While critiquing traditional forms of paternalism, it inculcates and generalizes a paternalist sensitivity as a technique of the governance of the self.
bi-weekly basis in the UN compound. There, they planned the future of the country without communicating with, or involving, any local partners.2 A Kosovar government official and a Sri Lankan civil society leader deplored similar phenomena in their own countries, where international actors coordinated among themselves without inviting any members of the host population. 3 What all of these anecdotes have in common is that they show international interveners acting with the best of intentions -to improve the welfare of others by re-establishing peace in conflict zones -but without the input or consent of the intended beneficiaries. In other words, they are textbook examples of international paternalism as defined by Michael N. Barnett in the Introduction to. this volume, and of "soft paternalism" as analyzed by Didier Fassin in Chapter 2. 4 Importantly, these actions are often perceived as such by the intended beneficiaries of international efforts, not only in Congo, Timor-Leste, or Kosovo, but also in many other conflict zones. Time and again, across all of my field sites, I, along with other researchers, heard the same kind of criticisms levied against interveners: Our local interviewees would complain that international peacebuilders were "arrogant," "condescending," and "paternalistic." 5 These stories underscore a tension that recurs throughout theaters of intervention between the discourse and the. practice of 2 A non-confidential source for this anecdote is the author's on-record interview with Ben Larke, Dili, Timor-Leste, February 2012. 
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international peacebuilding. That is, the values that interveners claim to have and the theories of effective peacebuilding that they aim to follow are at odds with actual practice ori the ground. "Consent" is supposed to be a prerequisite for any kind of UN engagement in conflict zones, but local people regularly complain that UN initiatives are imposed on them. 6 Schplars and practitioners routinely emphasize that solutions fostered domestically are much more likely to be effective and sustainable than arrangements that are externally dictated, but the latter prevail in ~any conflict zones.7 Why do interveners continually behave in ways that conflict with their own values and discourses? How do they justify their own imposition? How does domination interact with compassion in international peace building?
1 An interview I conducted with Ben Larke, a peacebuilder with twelve years of experience working for a variety of UN agencies and NGOs in Timor-Leste, illuminates the process through which interveners come to adopt a series of behaviors and attitudes that differ from and, at times, oppose the ones they aim for. 8 No matter how hard Larke and his colleagues tried to use "the most empowering methodologies," the "classic, almost paternalist thinking" that permeates aid efforts "crept into the psychology of everyone." To Larke, this patronizing attitude was roote~ in the very fact that he and his colleagues were "brought 6 On cons~nt, see "Principles of UN; Peacekeeping My own findings confirm Larke's analysis. As the first section of this chapter explains, two main elements are at the root of the paternalistic attitudes that recur in international pea<>ebuilding: first, the idea that local populations need help because they lack capacity and expertise, arid second, the belief that international actors have the capacity and the knowledge required to provide this help. The next section of this chapter locates the source of these two recurrent narratives in the politics of knowledge at work in international peacebuilding and clarifies how this politics of knowledge legitimizes international interference. The third section identifies the most important on-the-ground consequences of such a paternalistic approach: the fact that host populations regularly resist, challenge, or reject the international programs that are meant to help them. Throughout, I note exceptions to the dominant practices and highlight the benefits inherent to these alternative approaches. By way of conclusion, the last section identifies the three main obstacles to changing and ending these widespread practices: the role of accountability structures, the dilemma that international interveners face in balancing the inclusion of local actors with the hurdles that such inclusion often creates, and the detrimental byproducts of the politics of knowledge at work in the peacebuilding field. 9 This chapter underscores two points that are critical for this volume. First, ininternational peacebuilding, paternalism manifests itself in the process, ·rather than the goals, of intervention. Second, both "Western" and "non-Western" actors use the everyday practices, routines, and narratives I analyze. In other words, in contrast to John Hobson who argues that international paternalism is but an extension of Western liberalimperialism, I mailltain that African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American interveners engage in the everyday paternalism I describe just as much as European and North American peacebuilders.10 9 The analysis presented in the subsequent sections extensi\rdy draws on -and at times reproduces -the arguments formulated in Autesserre, Peace/and. I develop this argument based on several years of ethnographic inquiry in conflict zones around the world. I spent these years embedded in the transnational community of expatriates who devote their lives to building peace in foreign countries. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, these individuals have extremely varied geographical origins, professions, and organiz~tiortal affiliations, but they all inhabit a metaphorical world with specific customs, rituals, cultures, structures, beliefs, and taboos -a world that I call "Peace~nd." 11 At times I studied Peaceland from the inside, as a fellow intervener, and, other times, from the outside, as an academic researcher.
I base my analysis on more than 640 in-depth interviews as well as three and a half years of field observations, most of which offered extensive participant observatfon opportunities; I coll~cted this data primarily in Congo Insiders' and Outsiders' Capacity: The Dominant Narratives
The first source of' the interveners' paternalistic attitudes is the view that intended beneficiaries lack the capacity and expertise necessary to solve their own predicame1;1ts ..;. which justifies the need for foreigners to help host populations. A few vignettes from my fieldwork will illustrate how this view plays out on the ground.
A French NGO intervener deployed in eastern Congo explained to me that leaders in the country are unreliable -"state structures are very weak," "there is a lot of poor governance," and authorities must strike shady deals just to survive -"so only the ... foreigners are capable of enacting reforms." l heard these kinds of pejorative statements about Congolese populations and authorities from interveners of all national, professional, and organizational backgrounds. Many interviewees -including African contacts -deemed local and national authorities incompetent, uneducated, corrupt, dishonest, insensitive to the sufferings of their populations, and incapable of long-term planning. In addition, some of them described the Congolese people as poorly educated, lazy, self-centered, violent, or untrustworthy; these negative perceptions also extended to Congolese associations and civil society organizations. 13 In all of the conflict zones in which I worked, certain foreign peacebuilders expressed some form· of this same dismissive attitude. Some interveners painted the South Sudanese people as lazy, inept, hopeless, and aggressive,while others brandedTimoresenationals as backward, corrupt, and incompetent. Stich derogatory comments were also widespread in Afghanistan, Burundi, and Nicaragua; my contacts described the same phenomenon in Albania, Azerbaijan, Chad, and Rwanda; a fellow researcher observed it in Liberia; and Ilana Feldman's chapter in this volume includes similar examples from the Palestinian Territories. 14 Admittedly, expatriates and immigrant communities often criticize the citizens of the foreign countries in which they live, whether in America, Europe, or Africa. However, criticisms are particularly harsh and widespread among interveners deployed in conflict zones, regardless of these individuals' geographic origins, professions, or organizational affiliations.
That international peacebuilders come to belittle their intended beneficiaries so pervasively is puzzling given the blatant contradiction 13 
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between such attitudes and the values to which the vasi: majority of interveners claim to subscribe. The behavior surprises -and distresses -even the individuals who themselves engage in it. During a party I attended with other interveners in eastern Congo, a friend of mine went on a lengthy rant about how he could not stand the local people anymore. After a while, he paused, became very sad, and remarked on how he had changed in the year that he had spent in the field. All his ideals of equality, respect, and fairness had crumbled. He had become the very kind of person he used to hate. Only leaving t~e intervention world, he thought, would enable him to return.to normal. Not all interveners who engage in such self-reflection decide to change careers. Most of them, instead, try to fight the dominant discourse. In each of my field sites, I met expatriates who _ contested the dominant narratives and tried to rein in these types of careless comments. They reminded their colleagues that blanket statements; about entire populations were bound to do injustice to inany people. They pointed to the numerous local individuals they knew who defied the stereotypes and who had proved competent, intelligent, selfless, ~eli able, honest, hardworking, and fully dedicated to bettering the lives of their fellow citizens. They emphasized that despite the failings of state structures, many of their local counterparts had knowledge, expertise, and skills essential to peacebuilding. However, at best, these interveners were able to prevent one conversation or another from getting out of hand. They rarely managed to improve the overall image of local people.
The flipside of this discourse, which holds that host populations lack capacity and expertise, is the assumption that interverters have the knowledge necessary to compensate for local deficiencies -as l further explain in the next seC:tion. ·Together, these two ·narratives justify international imposition. This· is evident in Aisling Swaine's analysis of the nexus between humanitarian agencies' perceptions of Darfuri women as utterly powerless and their exclusion from decisionmaking.15 The words of a development worker I interviewed similarly encapsulate this dynamic. For over seventeen years, this expatriate had seen thousands of peacebuilders .arrive in _the city of Goma (eastern Congo). She explained that; although tliere, _;are exceptions, the general perspective of interveners in crisis situations is that "these poor, helpless, catastrophic people need our expertise," -so "we will do this for [them] ." As people who live in conflict and post-conflict settings are in situations of extreme vulnerability and in need of help, "almost automatically there is [a] power imbalance." Owing to this attitude, foreign peacebuilders "totally disregard capacities already here on the ground." She concluded, "It is like'.these people have no power, so they have no voice'."
Main Source of Paternalism in Peace Interventions: The Politics of Knowledge
Thematic and Local Expertise
The idea that outsiders have the capacity that host populations lack is rooted inthe politics of knowledge that characterizes international peacebuilding. In short, there is· an ongoing dispute over which· (and whose) knowledge matters most for effective peacebuilding. There are two principal contenders for this title. The first, which I refer to as either "local knowledge" or "country expertise," is based on a strong familiarity with specific places, whether countries, like Congo, or sub-national areas, like districts or villages. The second is a category that I call "thematic knowledge" or "technical expertise," and it relies on an in-depth understanding of particular aspects of intervention work. These may be general aspects, such as conflict resolution, development, or humanitarian aid, or they may be specialized ones, as in project management, public finance, or agricultural engineering. Both expatriate and local actors possess each type of knowledge to varying degrees; and they employ various strategies to demonstrate the importance of their particular expertise.
As other researchers have demonstrated, to be effective, peace interventions must draw on the local and thematic knowledge of both insiders and outsiders. 16 Whether they are local stakeholders with thematic 16 knowledge, expatriates with country knowledge, or vice versa, peacebuilders with various competencies each contribute different "perspectives, networks, assets, and leverage with particular constituencies," all of which are essential to peacebuilding. 17 These various interveners make the greatest contributions to peace when they work together, each challenging the biases of the other. 18 Unfortunately, a clear imbalance exists in the current international system. Just like Aisling Swaine has documented for humanitarian aid, the professionalization of the peacebuilding field has led to "the genesis of high-en.cl knowledge which lends authority to the external experts vis-a-vis the knowledge of the 'local' person." 19 In peacebuilding, the most valued expertise is that of foreign interveners who are trained in conflict-resolution techniques and who have extensive experience in a variety of conflict zones. By contrast, and although there are exceptions, country knowledge is much less valued, and the knowledge of local people is usually trivialized. 20 Recruitment practices emqody the valorization of thematic expertise over local knowledge. The "career" pages of non-governmental and international organizations' websites show that peacebuilding organizations recruit operational experts, such as "Civil Affairs Officer," "Financial Controller," or "Election Specialist." 21 They rarely hire anthropologists, historians, or other kinds of country-experts who can help interveners gain an in-depth understanding of their work environments, and they virtually never ask for a specialist on, for example, 17 Sudan or the Baucau district of Timor-Leste. Foreign ministries and diplomatic missions similarly privilege thematic expertise over local knowledge in the recruitment of their staff. 22 As always, there are variatiorts and exceptions to this trend. Some recruiters value local expertise more than others. In contexts like Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territories, country specialists have had more success in demonstrating the relevance of their knowledge to the overall intervention. This adjustment of knowledge hierarchies was evident in the comparatively larger proportion of expatriates I met whom had been hired based on their pre-existing familiarity with the area. However, even in such theaters of intervention, my contacts confirmed that peace building agencies still prioritized thematic expertise over local knowledge in the recruitment and promotion of their employees.
This predilection for thematic knowledge has numerous consequences for international efforts, which I have analyzed elsewhere. 23 Most relevant for this chapter is that it legitimizes outside interference and leads to an outsider bias.
Legitimization of Outside Inter{ erence
Valuing thematic expertise over local knowledge justifies the interveners' claim that they have the capacity necessary to resolve the host populations' problems. Foreign peacebuilders have technical expertise, whi.ch is often attested by degrees from prestigious universities aqd reinforced by work experiencein multiple conflict zones -all of which local counterparts rarely possess.
As a result, in virtually all aid and peacebuilding agencies, whether diplomatic, international, or non-governmental, expatriates hold the management positions, while local employees serve as staff. Very few local people make it into leadership positions in their countries of origin. To move up in the hierarchy, they have to go abroad and become expatriates themselves. In fact, most intervention structures value the expertise of local people only at the level of implementation, if at all. 24 26 The common characteristic of these otherwise diverse people and organizations is that they base their actions on in-depth local knowledge and reject universal approaches to peacebuilding. The most innovative among them rely on local employees supervised by a few foreigners (who often have extensive pre~existing country knowledge). In these exceptional cases, local staff and counterparts are in charge of conceiving, designing, and executing the projects. The expatriates view their roles as "providing technical support, resources, and international connections" to the plans formulated by the local stakeholders. 27 Apart from these exceptions, the marginalization of local input is widespread. While interveners often bemoan the lack of participation 25 and "buy-in" by local populations, they cannot, or do not, locate its source in their own practices.Tellingly, several interveners emphasized that "we cannot pacify Congo" (or Sudan, or Burundi) without the Congolese (or the Sudanese, or the Burundians), since "they are the ones who have the solution." To anyone outside of Peaceland, such a remark would have sounded like a truism. My interviewees, however, presented this argument as a profound conclusion born out of their long experience in conflict zones. To me, their statements high" lighted just how ingrained paternalism is in the everyday practice of peace building. The dominance of thematic expertise does not solely influence power relationships within peacebuilding organizations; it also shapes the overall structure of an intervention. It generates an outsider bias, as Dennis Tull and Pierre Englebert trace in their study of state reconstruction in Africa. They convincingly demonstrate that "the very nature of international reconstruction efforts suggests that the know!" edge, capacity, strategies, and resources of external actors are crucial ingredients forsuccess." 28 Combined with the negative view of local counterparts detailed earlier in this chapter, this pro-outsider bias entices international interveners to substitute themselves for local partners and, at times, to . act without their consent. Aisling Swaine. documents this problem with regards to emergency relief efforts, 29 and my contacts provided numerous examples from peacebuilding organizations. They told of expatriates fighting against injustice themselves instead of training grassroots activists . to do so, drawing up action plans for elections themselves instead of letting opposition leaders design their own electoral strategies, or carrying out state reconstruction projects themselves without consulting state authorities. In conclusion, one of these interviewees offered a striking remark: "With all their self-confidence, [interveners] think that they can construct the Congo without the Congolese." 30 There were exceptions within all organizations -people who tried, at their own level, to value country knowledge and local expertise 28 initiatives depend on the given project as well as the country, province, or village in which it takes place. Nevertheless; common patterns recur throughout areas of intervention. Some actors, varying in number depending on the context, cooperate with certain aspects of the intervention, either because they believe in the programs or because they use the international initiatives to reach their own goals. In many cases, however, local reactions to peace interventions also include much less supportive responses · such as non-engagement, subversion, contestation, cherry-picking, outright resistance, and rejection.3~ · , Other scholars have identified multiple reasons for these less supportive responses, including the local partners' poor understanding of international strategies, the presence of vested interests, the impact of financial and logistical copstraints on the projects, and the Western and liberal characters of the programs. 34 Local interviewees also often complained that, because foreign peace builders ignored focal expertise and input, intervenets implemented programs ill-adapted to local ;ituations -programs that occasionally worsened local conditions . and that intended beneficiaries had to combat.3 5 My research suggests an additional factor, which can be even more influential than the factors cited in existing literature, and which brings us back to the topic of . international paternalism. In my analysis, the varying degrees of nonacceptance are due to the very act of imposition.
As one Congolese intellectual described: The programs are often good, if you read the documents from the UN and all the others -at the core they have good intentions. That is not the problem, really.The problem is the bad set-up; things are badly set up from the start, so they cannot work People here, the supposed beneficiaries, are not consulted; they do not participate in anything. When [interveners design] a project, it is as if it fell on the heads of people here. 36 This quote reflects what I heard throughout my interviews with all kinds qf Congolese people. Local employees of international agencies explained that they felt excluded from the decision-making process within their organizations . . Intellectuals ~nd authorities regularly complained .. that ipterveners tried to impose their ideas, values, and standard operating , procedi.ires with no consideration of local knowledge and customs. All of these local actors . deplored their lack of influence over international strategies. Some of them overlooked these problems in order to benefit from the resources that interveners might provide (such as a steady salary or access to international networks), but others instead reacted by generating obstacles to the implementation of the international programs. For instance,. local staff and partners dragged their feet by canceling meetings, forgetting to attend theIJl, or creating state structures for the sole purpose of pleasing international donors but then never using them . Interviewees recalled witnessing similar dynamics in. Burundi, the Palestinian Territories, and South Sud;m. A former government official complained about interveners arriving with external systems and iqeas that disregarded existing Burundian ones; he explained that this practice led to "revolt'' by local people, either. through violence or through "a certain lack of discipline." 37 An American attorney worlcing in the Palestinian Territories explained how her counterparts would listen to what she said, and then "do .thing~ their own way, igno~ing the instructions or advice with which they disagreed." As her Palestinian colleagues themselves confirmed, they thought, "how dare she tell [them] what to do" in their own country, of which she knew nothing. Ilana Feldman's chapter on aid i_ n the Palestinian Territories emphasizes a similar point. 38 In her analysis, one of the main reasons why refugees might refuse aid is the United Nations' .attitude towards them. As Feldman explains, all these refugees' demands were about respect and engagement, about the fact that they had the capacity to know what they wanted and needed. Likewise, a Sudanese civil society activist reported that "friction between the donor's perception of how things should look and the communities' perceptions" resulted in various local communities "reject[ing] the intervention," saying "to hell with their money." 39 Or, as Aisling Swaine documents in her chapter, intended beneficiaries would openly criticize international agencies and request a change of strategy. Alternatively, my· Sudanese interviewee·· explained, communities "abandoned the project, worked against [it] by creating lots of obstacles," or simply let it collapse when the donor left. He concluded that "this is why some projects fail: because communi~ ties have never owned them, they were always owned by donors .... It is very common." Andrea Talentino reports a finding analogous to mine. 40 Through an in-depth study of local perceptions of eleven ongoing peace operations, Talentino demonstrates that "actors resist change, even when they might objectively agree that it is positive, if it seems forced upon them.'' 41 In all of her cases, even those where interveners were initially welcome (like in Kosovo and Liberia), she documents resentment at the imposition from at least some local groups -whether they were spoilers, elites, citizens, social groups, or a combination thereof. 42 Just like I have argued, Talentino also shows that this resentment results in pervasive obstructionism. Reyko Huang and Joseph Harris's analysis of capacity building by UN officials in Timor-Leste underscores a similar point. Expatriates making "direct or indirect attempts to impose" their ideas on national staff were met with "frowning and resistance," which compromised peacebuilding efforts. 43 Interestingly for the debate on paternalism, these local reactions rarely take the form of open, obvious contestation or outright rejection. Instead, the large majority are subtle attempts at resisting without antagonizing international actors or causing them to leave. Numerous contacts noted that, in most theaters of intervention, whether due to poverty or ·low state capacity, local stakeholders have so few resources ·~financial, logistic, or otherwise -to accomplish their goals that they rely on outside help to obtain the material assets needed to complete their work. A Filipino city official and a Kenyan peacebuilder used the same words to describe the resulting dynamics: "beggars cannot be choosers." 44 In Haiti, for instance, the government has to comply with donors' conditions. and suggestions because that is the only way it can get the financial resources it needs to governY Similarly, in Congo, the needs are so high that Congolese officials told me they "have to agree to anything" in the hope that it might "get [them] out of the ditch.''. 46 Interveners can thus -in the words of one of them -"set any kind of unreasonable rule [they] feel like" and impose the projects they want on their local counterparts. To make matters worse, the international peacebuilders deployed on the ground -those who meet regularly with local actors and set these seemingly unreasonable rules -are often individuals in their twenties or thirties. 47 The mere act of such young people arriving to advise seasoned, usually much older and much more experienced, ministers is inherently paternalistic -something that the interveners are often aware of and uncomfortable with. But again, most local elites will defer to these outsiders so as not to offend the people who can influence the distribution of material assets. Young interveners therefore feel that their advice is welcomed and their knowle:dge valued.
These various dynamics -create a vicious cycle. Local appeals for assistance weaken the position of local elites and strengthen that of the intervening organizations, which then perceive themselves to be taking on the core responsibilities of the state and civil society and, as a result, operate with increasing arrogance. Local NGOs and authorities often respond by behaving deferentially toward representatives of these organizations in an attempt to secure their financial, logistical, and political support. To obtain funding, even the strongest and most respected civil society organizations regularly allow outsiders to set their agenda, rather than challenging international interveners on what they see as the country's priorities. Such conduct further undermines the authority of local stakeholders and fuels the interveners' beliefs that they know more than their local counterparts, which in turn reinforces the international tendency to value external knowledge over local input. At the same time, the increased arrogance and tendency toward imposition leads to amplified, but often covert, opposition. As a result, the interveners think thatthe beneficiaries consent to their projects, while these beneficiaries are instead engaging in passive or concealed resistance. The dissonance was dear in interviews I conducted with local and foreign actors working on the same initiative: In numerous cases, the interveners would explain that they had full cooperation from their partners or staff, while the staff complained of what they perceived as paternalistic behavior on the part of the expatriates, and then went on to explain how they adapted, distorted, or created problems for the international efforts.
In contrast, the exceptional individuals and organizations who fight the trends documented in this chapter, involve local stakeholders in the design of the international programs, build on local knowledge, and solicit local input throughout the course of the project face fewer of the obstacles analyzed in this section and eventually achieve much greater success. Extensive research by Mary Anderson and her co-authors in twenty-one conflict zones around the world found that ''when people participate in all phases of an aid effort, from conception of the idea, to the design and planning, to implementation, and through final evaluation, they will 'own' the process and therefore be more likely to maintain the results." 48 A quantitative analysis of local involvement and international reconstruction efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina (from 1991 to 1995) and Somalia (from 1987 to 1997) substantiated this evidence. The study found that "phases in the peacebuilding process with high local participation [were] 48 Anderson et al., Time to Listen, associated with lower levels of hostility, while phases with little.local involvement tend[ed] to be associated with escalating violence." 49 Local communities in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Thailand, and Zimbabwe told similar stories: They worked harder to ensure that a project succeeded and persisted when they viewed it as "theirs," while they did not "put [in] as much effort" when they perceived it as a donor's or NGO's initiative. 50 Adam Moore reached a similar finding in his analysis of the United Nations' and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's peacebuilding effort~ in the Brcko district of BosniaHerzegovina. The differing success of two consecutive international attempts at integrating schools in post-war Brcko illustrates the importance of soliciting and integrating local input, as well as the problems that occur when interveners fail to do so. 51 The first ini.tiative occurred in 2000 "with little input from district officials or public discussion with concerned parents." It generated "massive protests" that "resulted in the temporary closure of the schools until changes were reversed." The. second attempt took place a year later. It started with extensive consultations of district citizens, teachers, and officials, to discuss their concerns and gain their support for the proposed change. The subsequent implementation of the reform pro~ ceeded smoothly with minimal incidents or public protest. Beyond school integration, international staff based in Brcko worked on a daily basis with their local counterparts and took their suggestions into account. In Moore's analysis, the cultivation of local officials as partners in the peacebuildillg pr.ocess was one of the reasons for the success of reforms in this district, while efforts in the rest of the country widely failed. sz 
Conclusion: Obstacles to Change
Two main elements are at the source of the paternalistic attitudes and behaviors that international peacebuilders routinely adopt when working on the ground in conflict zones. The first is the claim that host populations lack the capacity to resolve their own predicaments, and the second is the belief that international interveners possess this capacity. Both narratives are rooted in the politics of knowledge at ,work in the peacebuilding field, where thematic expt;rtise is much more Y;alued than country or local knowledge. The paternalistic attitudes a~d behaviors, when added to the narratives that justify them, antagomze host populations and generate widespread resistance a'nd rejectkm, creating significant obstacles for the international programs.
Paternalism is thus .. embedded both in the everyday practice of intervention on t. he ground and in the very nature of the i~terna tionalpeacebuilding system. As Ilana Feldman also emphasizes in her chapter, 53 it is from the moment that we identify a population or a pe~son as needing helpthat the dangers of paternalism first appear. This moment, when interpreted through the dominant international peacebuilding lens, divides people into helpers (those experts who are brought in from the outside because they have the required knowledge and capacities) and those in need of help (those non-experts who ~re ?n site. and lack capacity). From then on, there is a risk that paternalism may color any and all interactions· between interveners and host populations. Thankfully, there are exceptions to common paternalistic practices. The experiences of these exceptional individuals and organizations show both that another way of conducting international peacebuilding is possible and that these alternative approaches promote greate~ intervention success. They demonstrate that paternalism is not overdetermined by the structure. of the international peacebuilding system, no matter how ingrained it is in practice. Each intervener can contest the narratives and ·practices dominant among his or her colleagues, and in doing so, each of these individuals can challenge the structure of the overall system.
In fact, even among the foreign interveners who follow the dominant modes of operation, many individuals are aware that imposition 53 See Chapter 9 in this volume, 291-314.
.and the resulting lack of local buy-in to the international programs are problematic.These people and their agencies have therefore tried to take steps to mitigate these issues. "Local ownership" is now a buzzword in development and peacebuilding circles, and interveners ' . regularly consult with aI"ea authorities. Some. times, they even organize local focus groups when developing a new program. These actions are crucial to moderating the worst aspects of paternalism on the ground, but three elements counteract the broader efforts toward change.
. . The first element ;is that international peace builders face a dilemma. ()n the one hand; there are normative and practical reasons to encourage local participation and to avoid imposition. The idea of integrating ·host populations fits well with the liberal norms dominant on the international stage. The core idea of democracy (which the leading intervening organizations claim they want to spread) means participation ofor at the very least consent from,... local stakeholders. 54 The practical dimension is just as clear: most interveners know that local "participation leads to ownership [which in turn] leads to sustainability." 55 On the other hand, integrating local stakeholders may worsen the situation. To begin with, participation can slow things to a standstill. The more numerous the parties to a negotiation, the more difficult it becomes to reach an ;igreement and the higherthe likelihood that local spoilers will find an opportunity to hinder or even stall the peace process. 56 Furthermore, local stakehqlders regularly "game" the international system, interacting with interveners strategically in order to extract· as many resources from outsiders as possible and to maintain or increase their existing power. 57 Thus, as explained earlier in this chapter, foreign interveners often worry that privileging local demands may lead to policy capture. 58 In addition, governments and civil society groups do not necessarily try to promote the welfare of the population. As a result, partnering with national and local elites may actually reinforce existing problematic structures rather than promote peace. 59 Finally, in a number of situations, interveners alsoface irreconcilable differences with the local or national· elite, whose perspectives on contentious issues (like democracy and women's rights) may elicit demands that are unacceptable for many foreign and local peace builders.
Interviews with two donors, one based in South Sudan and the other in Congo, encapsulated the resulting dynamics. When we spoke, the first noted the problems inherent to imposing foreign ideas and mentioned that he and other interveners tried to involve their local counterparts in the design and implementation of international programs. He then explained why they regularly abandoned these efforts: Often expatriates get so frustrated at the behavior of their counterparts (like their abuse of power, resource embezzlement, and disregard for the plights of their fellow citizens) that they eventually stop trying to involve them or even get their consent. The second interviewee described the same dynamics in much harsher terms. In her words, the "contempt for local actors" rhat most of her expatriate colleagues shared made it seem appropriate for i.nterveners to "manipulate" local counterparts and try to impose programs and ideas on them. Whether framed in harsh or sympathetic language, the process is the same and so are the results: The dilemma international peacebuilders face reinforces their incentives to impose programs on host populations.
The second element that counteracts efforts toward change is that, for all interveners, accountability structures are oriented toward external entities, not toward beneficiaries. 60 NGOs are accountable to their donors, which are UN agencies, other international organizations, European and North American states, or private funders from abroad. Likewise, government donors are accountable to their taxpayers and legislators. Peacekeeping missions report to the UN Security Council, UN agencies report to their headquarters in New York and Geneva, and these headquarters report to the UN member states. Even academic researchers prioritize publication of their findings in prestigious journals and presses, which are overwhelmingly located in Europe or North America, over dissemination to local populations in order to maintain their positions at universities.
Admittedly, numerous intervening organizations have signed on to international charters aimed at improving downward accountability· such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and tht Accountability Charter for International NGOs. 61 Some of these agencies have also developed mechanisms to gather feedback from stakeholders about their efforts, including participatory evaluations, complaints and response systems, perceptions studies, community scorecards, citizen report cards, and story-telling. 62 However, these various initiatives are isolated, often incomplete, and they remain the exception rather than the rule. 63 The resulting predominance of upward rather than downward accountability deprives interveners of incentives to obtain the consent of their intended beneficiaries, and it deprives these beneficiaries of the power to request an end to paternalistic practices.
The last obstacle to change arises from the detrimental byproducts of the. politics of knowledge at work in the international peacebuilding field, which make it exceptionally difficult to move away from standard intervention routines. The experiences of the NGOs (such as International Alert and the International Rescue Committee) that have tried to promote local authorship and ownership by implementing community-driven reconstruction programs are telling. 64 According to my interviews with the staff working on such.initiatives, local communities are .so used to seeing foreigners arrive with a bossy attitude and set ideas that it becomes challenging to implement the new approach. Instead of giving their opinions and requesting what they actually need, a number of grassroots communities construct their appeals to reflect what they think the expatriates want to hear, as a way of ensuring access to funding and help. In other words, despite considerable efforts, these interveners, still often end up facing problems similar to those of .their colleagues who use less progressive methodologies.
International paternalism thus persists virtually unhindered, . a vicious cycle of imposition without consent. and passive .acceptance without appreciation. The actions of resistant local stakeholders and exceptional interveners may start to mitigate the worst consequences of paternalism on the ground, but they are unlikely to eliminate paternalism for good. In an attempt to thwart international attention to a situation that was increasingly being noted for extensive human rights violations, international and national organizations were subject to a very effective intimidation campaign. It was so successful that international agencies performed operations as if walking oh eggshells. There was a tacit consensus among agencies that the best-case scenario was to strive to maintain the provision of basic services,,even where this meant working around, and saying little publicly about, the rights violations that were occurring within and outside the carnps. I was working on what might have been considered the most sensi~ tive issue in that context at that time -the. prolific use of sexualized violence, particularly rape, against women by parties to the conflict in Darfur. Sexualized violence in. wartime is generally understood as a gendered violence, primarily impacting women and working off of gendered norms of power and inequalities between men arid women. The prolific use of sexualized violence by armed actors became synonymous with the Darfur conflict in 'the global media in ways that had not been seen since the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The image of the raped female victim also became ubiquitous with Darfur and in many ways became a cornerstone of the multiple global advocacy movements that arose to decry what was happening there, In this highly charged political situation, the act of rape and other kinds of sexualized violence took on hyper political significance. With the eyes of the International Criminal Court on the Darfur situation
